Quebec 1759 2.0 session report

Mark K. and I capped off our full day of gaming with a match of Quebec 1759 using the new 2.0 version of the rules, which adds leaders Montcalm and Wolfe and changes the value-less decoys of previous editions into 1CV "detachments" that proved to be of considerable value indeed.

Unlike the other session reports from that game day, this one won't include any pregame strategy notes for the very good reason that I had very little clue what I would do under the new rules!

Mark drew the French first, which suited me fine, because that meant I could put off deciding what to do even longer as the British setup is fixed and I could see how Mark might cope with the new conditions. He opted to stick with a typical French defend-the-beaches set up, with his blocks divided more or less evenly between the four zones of Levis, Montmorency, Beauport and St. Charles. I decided to use four of the detachments on suicide scouting missions which revealed that each beach was defended by a substantial force, with St. Charles a little stronger.

As each assault was going to be about as tough I decided to go for Levis, on the theory that it was the hardest to reinforce and success there would open up a larger part of the board. My first attempt at an assault by four 4CV regiments was bloodily repulsed, although I did do significant damage to the defending French militia. A second landing stayed ashore, as the outgunned French took their double-shot volley at the disembarking British and then retreated to Etchemin.

As the British built up their strength the French consolidated their troops at Abraham. There ensued a conventional British campaign of burning farms (occupying zones) and cutting supply (capturing Cap Rouge) followed by a turn 16 move into Abraham for a climatic battle that ended up going the British way.

Pondering the lessons of the first game, I decided that the forward French beach defense was obsolete now that the British had a plentiful supply of expendable scouts. Under the old rules impatient British players might be ambushed by an unexpectedly strong French force and more prudent British players would be forced to spend a couple of turns and risk some decent units to scout the French setup. Now the British could simply send out four detachments to use skirmish combat to reveal the whole French force.

Instead I decided to stuff St. Charles and Levis with units, almost half the French host, while holding Montmorency and Beauport with a detachment and a militia, respectively. My idea was that I would make St. Charles and Levis unassailable and force the British to commit to a north shore advance.

The British did, indeed, land at Montmorency and Beauport and started a buildup. When they got about halfway through I pulled the St. Charles forces back to Abraham and started the Levis troops to Etchemin. This was done to try to induce the British to split their forces and also use the whatever Levis troops survived (they were mostly Quebec militia with a few Montreal militiamen) to reinforce the main army.

About half the British force ended up going the Levis route, followed by the fleet. It soon became apparent that the British were stuck between the horns of a dilemma. Neither half of the British force was strong enough to take on the whole French militia-enhanced army by itself, but there was no way to combine them in the time left. Likewise there wasn't enough time left to capture Cap Rouge and hold it long enough to cut down on the number of Montreal militia. The British conceded on turn 15.

Mark K. and I have decided on a rematch. I want to see if I can come up with a counter for this new French approach.

Initial observations of Quebec 1759 version 2.0

Quebec 1759 is one of the true classic wargames of all time. It's been continuously in print since 1972, which is probably the record for a wargame. The only other hobby game that I can think of that has been in print longer is Diplomacy, which is sometimes considered a category unto itself. With the demise of Avalon Hill for than a decade past, which had kept some classics such as Afrika Korps, D-Day and Midway in print for decades, I think the mantle for longevity may very well have passed to Quebec 1759.

And it's been a very stable design, with mostly cosmetic changes over most of that time. Some rules clarifications and component upgrades have occurred, but the game itself has changed very little. Even War of 1812 and Napoleon, two other original designs from Gamma Two Games days have seen more significant changes.

Until Quebec 1759 2.0 anyway. This latest version of the game makes some subtle changes that breathe some fresh air into the design and should prompt a new look from gamers who haven't played it in a while.

The first and most obvious change is a pair of new units, leaders. Inspired perhaps, by the leaders in the revised Napoleon, these new counters add the overall commanders for each side, generals Wolfe and Montcalm.

Each acts as a regular one CV infantry unit with two special abilities and one special disability. The special abilities are A) they always fire at double fire (two dice) in combat. The rules aren't entirely clear, but it doesn't appear to me that this is increased for any reason, such as against an amphibious attack. B) They can move one or two zone in a move. The disability is that if they roll doubles with their two attack dice they are eliminated, so use them with care as there is a 1/6 chance per firing of losing them. This draconian rule is because of the historical fact that both commanders were mortally wounded on the field of battle.

While a colorful addition to the game, a single pair of 1CV units is unlikely to drastically change the game.

What does change things significantly is the substitution of 1CV "Detachments" for the 0 CV "decoys" in all previous versions of the rules.

While this might seem like a minor change, it is not. These new detachments are much your useful and flexible than their predecessors. Under the old rules decoys could never move by themselves or be left by themselves, so all they could do is inflate the strength of a position. While the British actually had more decoys than the French it was hard to get much use out of them. They could even act as drag on British deployments, as one might have to leave a real unit on Ile d'Orlean to babysit them. About the only real good they did was reduce the effectiveness of Indian scouting missions a little.

Now they add an additional seven CV to the British, putting them that much further from the magic level of 19CV where the British automatically lose. They can act as scouts and are good for sending off to burn out French farms, too. Overall they seem a benefit to the British, although they are useful to the French as well.

As to how much they change strategy, I'll have to play a few more times to firm up my opinion, but they do seem to have a major impact based on the pair of games that Mark and I recently played. More on that later this week.

Overall it appears like an interesting change.

Musings on British strategy in Quebec 1759

Five years ago I wrote some musings on British and French strategy in Quebec 1759, based on the 2001 version 1.1 edition of the rules. There's a new 2009 version that makes some changes, which I will be exploring this weekend. Here's what I said about British strategy in the older version.

Quebec 1759

Some musings on British strategy

The British have the burden of attack. With no advantage in numbers the British player must maneuver to one single known point and seize it in order to win the game and the campaign.

With 16 moves there is plenty of time to do what is necessary, although not so much time that the British can afford to waste moves.

The British force consists of five distinct groups of units, and it’s useful to consider their role when considering what strategies are possible.

The core of the British force is nine 4CV battalions of infantry. These units allow the British to mass a powerful striking force and are at the heart of any successful British strategy. When launching an amphibious assault with four units the British can start with 16 CV, which is a decisive edge against any comparably sized French force.The British also have a 3CV foot unit and a 2CV foot unit suitable for secondary tasks.

The British start with 8 decoy units. The defining trait of the block games is the fog of war provided by the blocks, although the British will have a harder time taking advantage of the fog due to their movement limitations and the homogeneous nature of their force. Still, the decoys do provide some possibility of faking the French out.

The British have two 3CV units of light troops, (Converged Light Infantry and American Rangers). While able to take their place in the line, if needed, these have also have the ability to retaliate against the French Indian unit if it raids an area the light troops occupy. As the only counter to this very useful French unit their placement should be carefully considered.

Lastly the British have four ship units. These are vital because their ferrying ability is the only way the British can get across the river from their starting position on Ile d‘Orleans. When to move them upriver is always a major decision.

There are basically two avenues of approach to Abraham. The first and most direct is to cross the Bason and land at either Montmorency, Beauport or St. Charles, defeat any defenders, consolidate and then march to Abraham, assaulting from St. Charles. While having the virtue of simplicity, this will rarely work unless the French, through misdeployment, allow the British to defeat them in detail.

Typically the French will let you come and the game comes down to a grand assault across the river at St. Charles into Abraham. This has a low probability for success, as the 47 CV of British are facing about 34-8 CV of usuable French defenders (The Indians have to be in reserve and 3-5 units of Quebec militia have deserted by then because of burnt farms in Montmorency, Beauport , St. Charles (and maybe Levis and Etchemin).

It’s a common misconception that the block games have a lot of luck because of the large number of dice rolls. Of course the opposite is true, the large number of dice rolls tend to even out. Luck is most noticeable in smaller battles. It just takes a lucky roll or two for a CV1 unit to defeat a CV2 unit. But 10CV of defenders stands almost no chance of defeating 20CV of attackers, even with the advantage of firing first.

In the case of a grand battle between most of the French and British armies the advantage lies with the French, because their entire army is expendable, whereas the British lose the campaign if reduced below 20 total CV. There almost no chance the British can eliminate all 30+ French before they lose 28 CV of their own, given the attritional nature of the combat system and the fact the French will be firing first (and at double fire the first round).

Such a direct approach also wastes the potential of wresting an advantage through maneuver.

Such a direct approach won’t take more than half the available turns to execute, although there is no advantage for the British to occupy Abraham at any point earlier than turn 16.

The second avenue of approach is across Bason to Levis, followed by consolidation and a march to Etchemin. Meanwhile the fleet moves upriver to St. Laurent. From Etchemin the British assault across St. Laurent to either Cap Rouge, Sillery or Abraham. This approach also has drawbacks. It requires a head-on amphibious assault into Levis, which is often heavily defended. And at the end the British are still left with the necessity of launching another amphibious attack into the teeth of the French, who can easily use their interior lines to redeploy from Montmorency-Beauport-St. Charles to Cap Rouge-Sillery-Abraham. This avenue also provides the French opportunities to catch the British divided. From a central position at Sillery, or Ste Foy, the entire French army could swoop down on a smaller British force at either Cap Rouge or Abraham.

On the other hand, this avenue of approach does present the opportunity to place the French defenders on the horns of a dilemma, because they have two points needing defending. If they allow the British to occupy Cap Rouge without resistance the steady erosion of the Montreal militia could result in the final grand battle at Abraham having just 20 CV of French (the six regular regiments and some militia) facing most of the British force. With an edge of 20 or so dice the British should easily rout the French before their own losses become critical.

The best chance of success comes from using both avenues of approach, flexibly. Eventually the British will probably have to move upriver via Levis unless the French mess up their deployment along the Bason. But maintaining a threat to St. Charles and burning the farms along the north bank to eliminate three Quebec militia is a key part of succeeding with the Levis approach.

With 16 turns the British have enough time to move significant forces around the limited campaign area, so long as on Turn 16 the main British force is moving into Abraham.

Typically the British player, feeling the pressure of time, will try to bull ashore with four 4CV units on the first turn somewhere along the Bason shore on the theory the French cannot be strong everywhere. If he guesses right, he strikes a weak spot held by a half dozen militia units or less and wins a stiff fight that guts the French army by eliminating a large chunk of the available force. If he guesses wrong, the British player experiences the historical result of a bloody nose and the need to try someplace else after a hasty retreat.

The British do have the time to do it right, however, using the Louisbourg Grenadiers or the 2/60th Foot for a reconnaissance. Landing a single unit forces the use of the “skirmish” rule, revealing all the defenders (no reserve) while exposing just 2Cv or 3CV to loss. A landing against the six French regulars will cost the British an average of 6Cv from the first fire, which will decimate a 16CV maximum British landing and force an immediate retreat. (Staying under such circumstances is most unwise). No matter how many French are firing and how lucky their rolls, they can’t kill any more than 2CV of Grenadiers if that is all that has landed.

One or two probes should uncover enough of the French defense to allow the 16CV brigade landing to hit someplace the French are not while not costing any more than 5CV and a couple of turns.

If the French main body is south of the river, land on the north shore against the weakest point, consolidate, defeat the militia and march on Abraham with 4-8 units.

If the French main body is on the north shore, take the Levis route, leaving one of the light units in Ile d’Orleans to scoot across Bason to torch farms once the French pull back to counter the Levis threat.

By switching between the two avenues of approach the British player aims to spread the French defenders, defeat them in detail, induce the militia to desert and set the stage for an advantageous final battle on the plains of Abraham on campaign turn 16.

Musings on French strategy in Quebec 1759

Some while back I posted these ideas on French strategy for the game Quebec 1759, based on the version 1.1 (2001) edition of the rules. The 2009 Version 2.0 edition makes some interesting changes which I will be exploring in a game planned for this weekend, so I thought it would be instructive to review what I had said before.

Quebec 1759

Some musings on French strategy

As the defender, the French are necessarily in a reactive role. Despite this, they have the first chance to shape the course of the game with their initial setup.

The French army actually outnumbers the British, both in total numbers (20 units to 13 units) and in Combat Value (48 CV to 47 CV).

The French force comprises three distinct groups of units, and it’s useful to consider their role when considering what strategies are possible.

The core of their army are six 3CV battalions of infantry. The only force able to stand toe-to-toe with a British 4-block 16CV brigade strike force, their careful placement is vital. Filling out the French force are 13 battalions of 2CV militia. While their CV are just as deadly as the regulars, most of them are vulnerable to being removed without a fight. The six Montreal militia and one TR militia will start to desert, one per turn, if the British capture Cap Rouge, while the Quebec militia goes home as British troops occupy areas, one block per area.

The last component is a single 4CV Indian unit, which may be the single most useful. Able to scout and raid anywhere on the map, this unit will play a big role in the French success.

There are also five decoy units.

For a detailed discussion of the map look at the British strategy article. Simply said, there are basically two avenues of approach to Abraham. The first and most direct is to cross the Bason and land at either Montmorency, Beauport or St. Charles, defeat any defenders, consolidate and then march to Abraham, assaulting from St. Charles. The second avenue of approach is across Bason to Levis, followed by consolidation and a march to Etchemin. Meanwhile the fleet moves upriver to St. Laurent. From Etchemin the British assault across St. Laurent to either Cap Rouge, Sillery or Abraham.There are basically two general strategies available for the French and either can work.

Although it’s anachronistic, I’ll label the two approaches the “Rommel” and the “Rundstedt,” named after the two World War II German field marshals who faced a similar strategic debate before D-Day.

In the “Rommel”: the French will make a stand at the water’s edge, trying to inflict such heavy losses on the British that they will be reduced to below 20CV and lose the campaign whether or not they make it to Abraham. This strategy is the most obvious and simplest, but is not without risk, because the French cannot be strong everywhere. A successful British landing can place the French in danger of being defeated in detail.

The “Rundstedt” attempts to use limited British naval lift capacity against them by using the French army’s interior lines to concentrate against and overwhelm isolated detachments of the British force.

Under the “Rommel” the French also have a decision to make about allocation of force to the four possible landing sites of St. Charles. Beauport, Montmorency and Levis. An obvious, but wrong, approach, is to simply divide the forces equally between the four. This abandons any chance to shape the British strategy and actually induces a British landing in the most dangerous spot, St. Charles. If every landing site is equally defended, then the British should land at the most strategic spot, St. Charles. And that landing will probably succeed, because an even distribution of the French army means that at least one column will be held by a single 2CV or 3CV unit. Seeing this, the British will use their reserve to reinforce their 4CV unit with a second 4CV unit, giving them a decisive 8CV vs. 2 or 3 and a quick rout for the French.The French will be forced to counterattack the following turn against the bulk of the British army and can expect to dash themselves to pieces in the attempt.

No, The French have to try to ambush the British with a strong enough force to have a realistic chance to repel a landing. The minimum required for this is six militia units. Pulling this off requires that the French leave at least one area undefended. This area cannot be St. Charles, and Levis is best defended as well, so the choices come down to Beauport and Montmorency. One should be defended by the six doomed Quebec militia while the other is held by dummies and one of the Montreal militia.

The Achilles heel of the “Rommel” is a prudent British player, who spends a couple of turns probing the French defense instead of trying to bull ashore right away. Once the British have discerned the shape of the French deployment they will land in a weak spot, consolidate and start maneuvering to induce desertions.

The “Rundstedt” is harder to play, but holds the potential for thwarting experienced British players by using the compartmented geography of the map against them. While using the Quebec militia (who will generally be deserting anyway) to skirmish against the initial British moves and aggressively scouting with the Indians in order to closely track British deployments, the bulk of the French army operates within the Abraham-Sillery-Ste. Foy-Cap Rouge quadrangle. This protects the two vital locations and provides a good opportunity to catch a part of the British army. Even if the British manage to get eight 4CV across in one spot this sets up a 32CV vs. 32CV slugfest that favors the French. The entire French host is expendable, while a long attritional fight is likely to leave the “victorious” British with less than 20CV on the map.

It’s possible to convert the “Rommel” into a “Rundstedt” if the French make sure to cover Levis with the Quebec militia and don’t stay too long on the north shore of the Bason once the British make their move.

Quebec 1759 British strategy

The British have the burden of attack. With no advantage in numbers the British player must maneuver to one single known point and seize it in order to win the game and the campaign. With 16 moves there is plenty of time to do what is necessary, although not so much time that the British can afford to waste moves.
The British force consists of five distinct groups of units, and it’s useful to consider their role when considering what strategies are possible.
The core of the British force is nine 4CV battalions of infantry. These units allow the British to mass a powerful striking force and are at the heart of any successful British strategy. When launching an amphibious assault with four units the British can start with 16 CV, which is a decisive edge against any comparably sized French force.
The British also have a 3CV foot unit and a 2CV foot unit suitable for secondary tasks.The British start with 8 decoy units. The defining trait of the block games is the fog of war provided by the blocks, although the British will have a harder time taking advantage of the fog due to their movement limitations and the homogeneous nature of their force. Still, the decoys do provide some possibility of faking the French out.
The British have two 3CV units of light troops, (Converged Light Infantry and American Rangers). While able to take their place in the line, if needed, these have also have the ability to retaliate against the French Indian unit if it raids an area the light troops occupy. As the only counter to this very useful French unit their placement should be carefully considered.
Lastly the British have four ship units. These are vital because their ferrying ability is the only way the British can get across the river from their starting position on Ile d‘Orleans. When to move them upriver is always a major decision.
There are basically two avenues of approach to Abraham. The first and most direct is to cross the Bason and land at either Montmorency, Beauport or St. Charles, defeat any defenders, consolidate and then march to Abraham, assaulting from St. Charles. While having the virtue of simplicity, this will rarely work unless the French, through misdeployment, allow the British to defeat them in detail.
Typically the French will let you come and the game comes down to a grand assault across the river at St. Charles into Abraham. This has a low probability for success, as the 47 CV of British are facing about 34-8 CV of usuable French defenders (The Indians have to be in reserve and 3-5 units of Quebec militia have deserted by then because of burnt farms in Montmorency, Beauport , St. Charles (and maybe Levis and Etchemin).
It’s a common misconception that the block games have a lot of luck because of the large number of dice rolls. Of course the opposite is true, the large number of dice rolls tend to even out. Luck is most noticeable in smaller battles. It just takes a lucky roll or two for a CV1 unit to defeat a CV2 unit. But 10CV of defenders stands almost no chance of defeating 20CV of attackers, even with the advantage of firing first. In the case of a grand battle between most of the French and British armies the advantage lies with the French, because their entire army is expendable, whereas the British lose the campaign if reduced below 20 total CV. There almost no chance the British can eliminate all 30+ French before they lose 28 CV of their own, given the attritional nature of the combat system and the fact the French will be firing first (and at double fire the first round).Such a direct approach also wastes the potential of wresting an advantage through maneuver. Such a direct approach won’t take more than half the available turns to execute, although there is no advantage for the British to occupy Abraham at any point earlier than turn 16.
The second avenue of approach is across Bason to Levis, followed by consolidation and a march to Etchemin. Meanwhile the fleet moves upriver to St. Laurent. From Etchemin the British assault across St. Laurent to either Cap Rouge, Sillery or Abraham. This approach also has drawbacks. It requires a head-on amphibious assault into Levis, which is often heavily defended. And at the end the British are still left with the necessity of launching another amphibious attack into the teeth of the French, who can easily use their interior lines to redeploy from Montmorency-Beauport-St. Charles to Cap Rouge-Sillery-Abraham. This avenue also provides the French opportunities to catch the British divided. From a central position at Sillery, or Ste Foy, the entire French army could swoop down on a smaller British force at either Cap Rouge or Abraham.On the other hand, this avenue of approach does present the opportunity to place the French defenders on the horns of a dilemma, because they have two points needing defending. If they allow the British to occupy Cap Rouge without resistance the steady erosion of the Montreal militia could result in the final grand battle at Abraham having just 20 CV of French (the six regular regiments and the steadfast Trois Rivieres militia) facing most of the British force. With an edge of 20 or so dice the British should easily rout the French before their own losses become critical.
The best chance of success comes from using both avenues of approach, flexibly. Eventually the British will probably have to move upriver via Levis unless the French mess up their deployment along the Bason. But maintaining a threat to St. Charles and burning the farms along the north bank to eliminate three Quebec militia is a key part of succeeding with the Levis approach. With 16 turns the British have enough time to move significant forces around the limited campaign area, so long as on Turn 16 the main British force is moving into Abraham.Typically the British player, feeling the pressure of time, will try to bull ashore with four 4CV units on the first turn somewhere along the Bason shore on the theory the French cannot be strong everywhere. If he guesses right, he strikes a weak spot held by a half dozen militia units or less and wins a stiff fight that guts the French army by eliminating a large chunk of the available force. If he guesses wrong, the British player experiences the historical result of a bloody nose and the need to try someplace else after a hasty retreat.
The British do have the time to do it right, however, using the Louisbourg Grenadiers or the 2/60th Foot for a reconnaissance. Landing a single unit forces the use of the “skirmish” rule, revealing all the defenders (no reserve) while exposing just 2Cv or 3CV to loss. A landing against the six French regulars will cost the British an average of 6Cv from the first fire, which will decimate a 16CV maximum British landing and force an immediate retreat. (Staying under such circumstances is most unwise). No matter how many French are firing and how lucky their rolls, they can’t kill any more than 2CV of Grenadiers if that is all that has landed.
One or two probes should uncover enough of the French defense to allow the 16CV brigade landing to hit someplace the French are not while not costing any more than 5CV and a couple of turns.
If the French main body is south of the river, land on the north shore against the weakest point, consolidate, defeat the militia and march on Abraham with 4-8 units.
If the French main body is on the north shore, take the Levis route, leaving one of the light units in Ile d’Orleans to scoot across Bason to torch farms once the French pull back to counter the Levis threat.
By switching between the two avenues of approach the British player aims to spread the French defenders, defeat them in detail, induce the militia to desert and set the stage for an advantageous final battle on the plains of Abraham on campaign turn 16.

Quebec 1759 French strategy

Quebec 1759
Some musings on French strategy
As the defender, the French are necessarily in a reactive role. Despite this, they have the first chance to shape the course of the game with their initial setup.The French army actually outnumbers the British, both in total numbers (20 units to 13 units) and in Combat Value (48 CV to 47 CV).
The French force comprises three distinct groups of units, and it’s useful to consider their role when considering what strategies are possible.
The core of their army are six 3Cv battalions of infantry. The only force able to stand toe-to-toe with a British 4-block 16CV brigade strike force, their careful placement is vital. Filling out the French force are 13 battalions of 2CV militia. While their CV are just as deadly as the regulars, most of them are vulnerable to being removed without a fight. Only the single Trois Rivieres militia is steadfast and will be around until the end. The six Montreal militia will start to desert, one per turn, if the British capture Cap Rouge, while the Quebec militia goes home as British troops occupy areas, one block per area.
The last component is a single 4CV Indian unit, which may be the single most useful. Able to scout and raid anywhere on the map, this unit will play a big role in the French success.
There are also five decoy units.
For a detailed discussion of the map look at the British strategy article. Simply said, there are basically two avenues of approach to Abraham. The first and most direct is to cross the Bason and land at either Montmorency, Beauport or St. Charles, defeat any defenders, consolidate and then march to Abraham, assaulting from St. Charles. The second avenue of approach is across Bason to Levis, followed by consolidation and a march to Etchemin. Meanwhile the fleet moves upriver to St. Laurent. From Etchemin the British assault across St. Laurent to either Cap Rouge, Sillery or Abraham.
There are basically two general strategies available for the French and either can work.
Although it’s anachronistic, I’ll label the two approaches the “Rommel” and the “Rundstedt.”In the “Rommel”: the French will make a stand at the water’s edge, trying to inflict such heavy losses on the British that they will be reduced to below 20CV and lose the campaign whether or not they make it to Abraham. This strategy is the most obvious and simplest, but is not without risk, because the French cannot be strong everywhere. A successful British landing can place the French in danger of being defeated in detail.
The “Rundstedt” attempts to use limited British naval lift capacity against them by using the French army’s interior lines to concentrate against and overwhelm isolated detachments of the British force.
Under the “Rommel” the French also have a decision to make about allocation of force to the four possible landing sites of St. Charles. Beauport, Montmorency and Levis. An obvious, but wrong, approach, is to simply divide the forces equally between the four. This abandons any chance to shape the British strategy and actually induces a British landing in the most dangerous spot, St. Charles. If every landing site is equally defended, then the British should land at the most strategic spot, St. Charles. And that landing will probably succeed, because an even distribution of the French army means that at least one column will be held by a single 2CV or 3Cv unit. Seeing this, the British will use their reserve to reinforce their 4CV unit with a second 4CV unit, giving them a decisive 8CV vs. 2 or 3 and a quick rout for the French.
The French will be forced to counterattack the following turn against the bulk of the British army and can expect to dash themselves to pieces in the attempt.
No, The French have to try to ambush the British with a strong enough force to have a realistic chance to repel a landing. The minimum required for this is six militia units. Pulling this off requires that the French leave at least one area undefended. This area cannot be St. Charles, and Levis is best defended as well, so the choices come down to Beauport and Montmorency. One should be defended by the six doomed Quebec militia while the other is held by dummies and one of the Montreal militia.
The Achilles heel of the “Rommel” is a prudent British player, who spends a couple of turns probing the French defense instead of trying to bull ashore right away. Once the British have discerned the shape of the French deployment they will land in a weak spot, consolidate and start maneuvering to induce desertions.
The “Rundstedt” is harder to play, but holds the potential for thwarting experienced British players by using the compartmented geography of the map against them. While using the Quebec militia (who will generally be deserting anyway) to skirmish against the initial British moves and aggressively scouting with the Indians in order to closely track British deployments, the bulk of the French army operates within the Abraham-Sillery-Ste. Foy-Cap Rouge quadrangle. This protects the two vital locations and provides a good opportunity to catch a part of the British army. Even if the British manage to get eight 4CV across in one spot this sets up a 32CV vs. 32CV slugfest that favors the French. The entire French host is expendable, while a long attritional fight is likely to leave the “victorious” British with less than 20CV on the map.
It’s possible to convert the “Rommel” into a “Rundstedt” if the French make sure to cover Levis with the Quebec militia and don’t stay too long on the north shore of the Bason once the British make their move.

Featured game: Quebec, 1759

The granddaddy of block games, Quebec 1759 has been in print since 1972, which probably sets some records for wargames.
The essential feature of so-called block wargames are the wooden blocks. Military units are represented by wooden blocks which are placed on edge, Stratego-style, to hide their identity and strength from the enemy. The four sides of the blocks are used to provide a paperwork-less method of step reduction. Typically a unit will have a “Combat Value” (CV) of 1-4, with numbers or pips along each side to depict its current strength. As the unit takes losses the block is rotated to show the current strength on top. Typically the number of dice a unit can roll is the same as its CV, so a CV 3 will roll three dice when it attacks an enemy unit. Which die roll numbers represent hits can vary from game to game, and is often modified by various conditions, but in Quebec 1759 each “6” is a hit.
Quebec 1959 introduced these mechanics and its still a very good introductory wargame. Usually taking less than an hour to play, it takes just a few minutes to explain and set up.
Each side has 25 blocks, blue for the French and Red for the British. Each side has some blank decoy blocks. The British army comprises nine battalions of regular foot at CV 4, a regular foot of 3 CV, a light infantry unit with 3 CV, some American rangers at 3 CV and a small Grenadier battalion with 2 CV. The French have an Indian unit with 4 CV, six regular battalions with 3 CV each and 13 militia units with 2 CV each. The British also have four naval units which have no CV but can each ferry one block across a water area.
The intriguing thing in the game is the geography of the battlefield. Depicting the area immediately surrounding Quebec City in what is now Canada, there are only 10 land areas and two sea areas, making this map one of the smallest, in terms of distinct locations, ever used for a wargame. The two water areas, the Bason (downriver from Quebec City) and St Laurent (upriver) divide the land zones into three distinct regions. The Ile d’Orleans is where the British army starts, across the Bason from the other land areas. Along the southern side of the map is Levis and Etchemin. Along the northern side of the map, from east to west, are the areas of Montmorency, Beauport, St. Charles, Abraham, Sillery, Ste. Foy and Cap Rouge.
Movement is simultaneous, with each side able to conduct one move per turn. A move consists of moving units from any one area to one or more adjacent areas or by ferry across a water zone to an area. The British can, instead of a regular move, move his ships from one water zone to the other.The British problem is to ferry their troops across the river in the face of the French and march to capture the Abraham area. If the British are in sole possession of Abraham on the 16th turn and still have at least 20 CV total, they win. If the French reduce the British to below 20 CV at any point, they win. No draw is possible.Combat is conducted by dividing the block in a mutually occupied area into three columns (left, center, right) and a reserve. The blocks in each column alternate firing (defender first) at each other until one enemy column is emptied of units, at which point that force instantly routs and must retreat from the area.
Elegant in its simplicity, Quebec 1759 was under appreciated when it came out in 1972 during the early days of the hex-and-counter wargame era. Now that tastes in gaming have changed and we are in the era of the stylistic, elegant Eurogame, Quebec 1759 and its ilk are finding new fans.The game takes less than 5 minutes to set up, plays in less than an hour and has less than four pages of rules.
Recommendations
(Yes) For Wargamers: Uses simple mechanics to capture the campaign with authenticity yet provides a competitive game as well.
(Yes) For Collectors: The first block game, early editions are sought by collectors.
(Yes) For Euro gamers: An excellent entry into board war gaming with quick game play, elegant mechanics and attractive components.