Argentina strikes back -- The Sheffield hit 30 years ago

HMS Sheffield hit, May 4, 1982

Any illusions that the war would be entirely one-sided for the British were shattered on May 4 when word came that the HMS Sheffield had been hit by an Exocet missile. While the ship remained afloat, it had to be abandoned ad a fire raged out of control and it would eventually sink under tow. Twenty crew were killed and another two dozen wounded.

The loss came as the Sheffield was on radar picket duty west of the British task force. Radar picket duty is a necessary, but very dangerous, duty, as the US Navy discovered during the closing months of World War II when dozens of escorts were damaged and destroyed by Kamizake attacks.

Fortunately for the British , the Argentinians didn't have dozens  of Exocets. Indeed, they had just five of the air-launched versions and just five Super Etendard attack planes to carry them. This was another negative consequence of the Argentinian decision to rush the start of the war. Had they waited until September they would have had a total of at least 10 Exocets and 14 planes to carry them.

In  a very well-planned and executed mission the Argentinian Navy aviators in two Super Etendard, supported by a Neptune recon plane, were able to fire two missiles and escape without being engaged. One missile apparently failed to find a target but the second w=one hit the Sheffeild, which wasn't prepared properly for defending against a missile attack. It's shipboard radars and air defenses never spotted the threat and the only warning it got was from voice shouts after Mark 1 eyeballs spotted the incoming missile just seconds before it hit. 

It seems evident that the missile did not explode, but rocket fuel and other combustibles combined to fuel a fire that burned out the ship.

It's interesting to go back and read the accounts from the time of the incident. I have the Osprey special editions on the Falklands War (Men-At-Arms No. 133-135) and the Sunday Times of London's "War in the Falklands -- The Full Story," all published in 1982 shortly after the close of the war. While not bad, considering how quickly they were done, they do make a number of claims that turned out to not be true -- and suffer from minimal input form the Argentinian side.

The Harpoon4 supplement South Atlantic War 2nd Ed., which is my main source, was published in 2002 and had the advantage of much better information and much more information from the Argentinian side. One difference, for example, is the supposed role of the Argentinian submarine sin the incident.  At the time, the British ships reported "torpedo wakes" near the stricken Sheffield. The Osprey book asserts that "It seems probable that both of the Argentine Type 209 submarines were in the vicinity. Some reason exists to believe that one of them may have been hit, and perhaps sunk, by a Stingray torpedo released from a Sea King helicopter.

We now know that there were in fact no Argentinian subs present that day and, in fact, only one of the Type 209 submarines was even operational. A nice illustration of the news truism that the first reports are always wrong.

HMS Sheffield Day

HMS Sheffield burns after being hit by an Exocet missile

Just two days after the sinking of the cruiser Belgrano, any thoughts that the war would be a one-sided affair came to an abrupt end on May 4, 1982 when the HMS Sheffield was hit by an Exocet missile fire by an Argentine Super Etendard.

While it took a few days for the ship to actually sink, it was immediately clear that the HMS Sheffield was essentially destroyed as far as taking any further part in the war. In the event the abandoned ship foundered in heavy seas while under tow. While not as bloody as the Belgrano incident, as only 20 British sailors lost their lives, the Sheffield loss was perhaps even more shocking.

While the Belgrano case was of a World War II era vessel being sunk by essentially World War II era technology (an unguided torpedo) the HMS Sheffield was a first-line modern warship. And the Exocet missile was likewise an expensive first-line weapon.

One wonders how different the war might have been if the Argentines had the full complement of Super Etenard (12) and Exocet missiles (10) they had ordered from France, instead of the 5 and 5 they actually had on hand. As it was, between them, those five missiles were able to sink two British ships while suffering no losses. In comparison it cost the Argentines more than three dozen attack aircraft to sink three more British ships (although the score would have been higher had more Argentine bombs exploded). At a ratio of 12 to 1 the Argentines simply ran out of aircraft before the British ran out of ships.

On the other hand, with 10 Exocets instead of 5 the British could easily have lost a couple of more ships, with a reasonable chance that one of those ships might have been an aircraft carrier. It's possible that losing a carrier would have forced the British to withdraw the task force. At the very least it would have reduced the already scanty level of British air cover substantially and made the situation much riskier for the invasion force. Harriers were responsible for shooting down about 22 or 23 Argentine attack aircraft. Ship defenses only downed about 15, so removing the Harriers from the defensive scheme might have changed the balance of power.

Fortunately for the British, the Argentines had only taken deliver on five missiles and five panes and the embargo prevented them from getting any more. This was another example of how the junta's hasty decision to move up the invasion date cost them.